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MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND COMPENSATION IN GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVE: HOW DOES THE U.S. DO IT?
DAVID A. HYMAN* & CHARLES SILVER"
INTRODUCTION
We face a daunting challenge: describe in limited space the manner in
which the United States regulates medical practice by compensating pa-
tients harmed by medical treatments, and summarize the enormous empiri-
cal literature addressing these subjects. The task would be difficult even if
the United States had a single system for handling these issues. In fact, it
has a patchwork of arrangements that divide responsibility among diverse
governments (federal and state), regulators (medical boards, insurance
commissioners, and others), and private entities (including, but not limited
to, hospitals, insurance carriers, physicians, and patients). The health care
system in the U.S. is famously fragmented, making both regulation and
summarization trying affairs.'
One level of complexity is the result of federalism: the United States
has more than fifty distinct state-level regulatory and legal systems, each
with its own variations and idiosyncrasies. 2 Consider a simple example:
more than thirty states cap damages in medical malpractice cases. In states
that limit damages, the details of the cap vary widely. A few states restrict
total damages, but most limit only non-economic damages (i.e., pain and
suffering). The caps are set at different levels, and only some adjust for
inflation. Some caps vary depending on whether the plaintiff is deceased.
Others are tied to the number of defendants. Some impose different caps
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stein Program in Health Law and Policy and Professor of Medicine at the University of Illinois College
of Law.
** Charles Silver is the Roy W. and Eugenia C. McDonald Endowed Chair in Civil Procedure
and Co-Director of the Center on Lawyers, Civil Justice, and the Media at the University of Texas at
Austin School of Law.
1. Einer Elhauge, Why We Should Care About Health Care Fragmentation and 1-low To Fix It, in
THE FRAGMENTATION OF U.S. HEALTH CARE: CAUSES AND SOLUTIONS 1, 3 (Einer Elhauge ed., 2010).
2. Yes, we know how many states there are. But, when you include the District of Columbia and
Puerto Rico (not to mention Guam and the other territories) there are more than fifty separate systems
of malpractice law/entities with regulatory authority over the practice of medicine. Thus, there are fifty-
six Medicaid program, even though there are only fifty states. U.S. DEP'T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN




depending on whether the defendant is a physician or an institutional de-
fendant (i.e., a hospital or nursing home). Thus, there is substantial state-
level variation in the amount of damages that may be awarded in medical
malpractice cases even in states that cap damages-variation that naturally
increases when states that do not cap damages are added to the mix.
Further complications result from the interaction of the state and fed-
eral systems. Although states possess primary regulatory authority over
both the practice of medicine and civil and criminal litigation, the federal
government plays an important role as a major purchaser of health care
services: through Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP, and as a provider of
health care services through the Veterans Administration and the Indian
Health Service; through the U.S. Food & Drug Administration's exclusive
licensing authority regarding the sale of pharmaceuticals and medical de-
vices; through federal regulation of controlled substances (which influences
pain management practices); and through federal regulation of billing prac-
tices (through the civil False Claims Act and criminal prohibitions on
health care fraud and abuse). The federal government's role may also grow
if it ends up operating the exchanges that are to be adopted pursuant to the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA).
To be sure, federal courts play a less significant role than state courts.
Federal authority over malpractice is limited to cases brought under the
Federal Tort Claims Act, and concurrent jurisdiction in cases involving
citizens of different states where more than $75,000 is at issue. 3 But federal
courts have played leading roles in high-profile lawsuits affecting health
care policies, including cases in which physicians have challenged private
payers' reimbursement practices, cases in which physicians, pharmacies,
and nursing homes have sought to overturn reductions in Medicaid pay-
ments imposed by states, and cases in which states and private parties have
argued that the PPACA is unconstitutional.
A final level of complexity results from the multiplicity of entities
with implicit or explicit authority over the practice of medicine, including
medical schools, residency programs, accrediting agencies, specialty
boards, teaching and community hospitals, courts, and state licensing agen-
cies. State and federal agencies also maintain registries or databases of
adverse events, payouts in malpractice cases, infection rates, and mortality
and morbidity rates for medical procedures. If one broadens the field to
encompass insurers, there are public and private entities covering various
sections of the population, whose purchasing and coverage rules can influ-
3. The Federal Tort Claims Act covers malpractice actions involving federal employees and
volunteers at federally qualified health centers and free clinics.
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ence the frequency of adverse medical events and the financial conse-
quences for those who suffer a medical injury. Liability insurers, who ab-
sorb losses and sometimes refuse to continue coverage, may also influence
treatment patterns.
There is one area marked by simplicity and clarity: apart from the
population-specific coverage of Medicare (people who are sixty-five years
and older and those in chronic renal failure), Medicaid (the poor), and
SCHIP (children below a specified income level), the United States does
not have a social insurance system. Thus, for a clear majority of the popula-
tion, there is no occasion to describe the interaction between the social
insurance and tort systems. Even for those who participate in these pro-
grams, there is little to discuss, since they have historically occupied differ-
ent spheres. Administrators of the Medicare and Medicaid programs, for
example, have long viewed their job as paying for the care received by
their beneficiaries, and have not troubled themselves unduly about the qual-
ity and cost-effectiveness of that care. Until quite recently, when a Medi-
care or Medicaid beneficiary suffered a medical injury, both programs
simply paid the resulting bills-creating exactly the wrong incentives. Nei-
ther program took steps to improve the way providers responded to mal-
practice claims. To the contrary, as things currently stand, both programs
probably weaken the liability system's ability to police negligent practi-
tioners. Because both programs pay for the bills that result from a medical
injury, they have a statutory subrogation right that entitles them to share in
any recovery. The amounts left over once Medicare and Medicaid have
been repaid are often too small to motivate patients to sue-let alone to
motivate a plaintiffs' attorney to take their cases.
Part I turns to a more detailed description of the details of the regula-
tory, liability, and compensation systems. Part II explores the literature on
medical error/adverse events, and the performance of the liability system.
Part III evaluates how ordinary citizens feel about the liability system. Part
IV describes how incentives shape the performance of these interlocking
systems. Part V offers a perspective from our work with closed malpractice
claims from Texas. Part VI concludes.
I. DETAILS OF THE APPLICABLE REGULATORY AND
LIABILITY/COMPENSATION SYSTEMS
A. Regulating the Delivery ofMedical Care
To practice medicine, an individual must graduate from a medical
school, complete an accredited residency, and obtain a license to practice
2012] 165
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medicine from a state licensing board-with the requirements varying from
state to state. Licenses do not typically differentiate based on medical spe-
cialty; both a pediatrician and a neurosurgeon secure an identical license to
practice medicine from the issuing authority. All fifty states impose a re-
quirement for Continuing Medical Education (CME) to maintain licen-
sure.4 However, no state requires malpractice/error-prone physicians to
undergo more frequent CME, or take affirmative steps to reduce the fre-
quency of these problems. A physician may obtain board certification in a
particular specialty or specialties, but certification is voluntary. However,
many boards require CME as a condition of continued board certification.
Once physicians are licensed, other entities can influence the scope of
their practice. A physician who wishes to admit patients to a hospital must
obtain "privileges" at that institution. Hospitals can condition the granting
of privileges in various ways, and may limit the services that physicians
may provide using hospital resources (i.e., a hospital is unlikely to allow a
pediatrician to perform neurosurgery). Hospitals generally require physi-
cians to maintain malpractice coverage in a specified amount, with the
precise amount varying from hospital to hospital. Physicians may also be-
come direct employees of a hospital or of a managed care plan, and those
entities can also impose restrictions on the scope of practice.
Hospitals are accredited by private entities. These accrediting entities
profoundly influence the behavior of hospitals, because loss of accredita-
tion means that the hospital may not be paid for the services it provides (at
least not by public payers). 5
State medical boards are supposed to regulate the quality of health
care provided by state-licensed physicians, but in practice these boards are
lax. A 2011 report studied how state medical boards handled the cases of
10,672 physicians whose clinical privileges were revoked or restricted by a
hospital.6 They found that state medical boards had taken no action in over
4. State Medical Licensure Requirements and Statistics 2010, AMERICAN MEDICAL
ASSOCIATION (2010), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/amal/pub/upload/mm/40/tablel6.pdf.
5. The Joint Commission on Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) has played a significant role in
recent years in encouraging hospitals to adopt patient safety initiatives. Kelly J. Devers et al., What Is
Driving Hospitals' Patient-Safety Efforts?, 23 HEALTH AFF. 103, 112-13 (2004). JCAHO has not
always had this reputation, as an excerpt from an online posting by a hospital administrator indicates:
We never worried about JCAHO until the three months prior and the two days of the inspec-
tion. In the three months prior we backdated all the documentation that we needed to get
through the inspection, and in the two days they were there we spent telling them how fo-
cused we were on quality, etc. As long as the paperwork is in order, people can be dying in
the halls and there could be guppies in the IV fluid; the JCAHO wouldn't notice.
MARK A. HALL ET AL., THE LAW OF HEALTH CARE FINANCE AND REGULATION 373 (1st ed. 2005).
6. See generally ALAN LEVINE ET AL., STATE MEDICAL BOARDS FAIL TO DISCIPLINE DOCTORS
WITH HOSPITAL ACTIONS AGAINST THEM (2011), available at
http://www.citizen.org/documents/1 937.pdf.
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half of these cases. Because hospitals generally restrict clinical privileges
only in response to the worst cases, this study suggests that state medical
boards are failing to address even the problems that are identified for them
by others.
In reality, the most significant "regulator" of health care practice is the
payment system. At least at the federal level, payment policy is health poli-
cy, and health policy is payment policy. In recent years, public and private
payers have taken baby steps in the direction of using their payment sys-
tems to reward error-free care. These programs have been variously de-
scribed as "value-based purchasing," "payment for performance," and non-
payment for "never events." Unfortunately, these efforts have not changed
the core incentives created by the dominant encounter-based, quality-
insensitive, fee-for-service payment system that otherwise rules the roost.
B. Liability/Compensation Systems
1. Fault-Based (Negligence)
In the United States, the determination of liability and compensation is
almost entirely the province of the civil tort system. As detailed below,
there are small pockets of no-fault liability, but negligence is the rule for
most patients in most settings. Plaintiffs may not recover for injuries stem-
ming from adverse events or errors unless a provider was negligent-and
as outlined in Part III, most negligently injured patients do not recover,
regardless.
Malpractice straddles the divide between contract and tort. Most law-
suits arise out of a consensual relationship between physician and patient,
creating an implied duty to exercise reasonable care. States have struck
down attempts to modify or eliminate this duty by contract, although many
have allowed contracting over other terms (such as whether plaintiffs must
arbitrate their claims). States have also experimented with a wide array of
tort reforms, including a number of process-based reforms (e.g., screening
panels, certificates of merit, and abbreviated statutes of limitation). Table 1
gives a sense of the range of tort reforms that jurisdictions have adopted.
TABLE 1. MALPRACTICE REFORMS
Insurance Market Joint underwriting associations/patient compensation funds
Reforms Prior approval of rate increases
Mandatory reporting of closed claims
Medical Quality Peer review protections
Reforms Mandatory reporting of liability payouts and errors
2012]1 167
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Aimed at the size of recoveries
Damage caps (punitive, non-economic, and total damages)
Abrogation of joint and several liability
Offset for collateral source payments
Aimed at plaintiffs' difficulty (or costs) of winning
Expert witness requirements
Informed consent limits
Professional standard of care, and not ordinary negligence
Aimed at functioning/cost of judicial process
Mediation
Notice of intent to sue
Mandatory pretrial conferences
Alternative Dispute Resolution
Source: See Randall R. Bovbjerg, Legislation on Medical Malpractice: Further Developments
and a Preliminary Report Card, 22 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 499 (1989).
The failure to exercise reasonable care is treated as a tort, and tort
remedies are available for breach. For most specialties, states have largely
abandoned the "locality rule" that treated compliance with local custom as
a complete defense. However, legislatures have responded by imposing
limitations on who can testify about the standard of care-effectively re-
imposing a modified version of the locality rule while simultaneously in-
creasing the costs of litigating such cases (since limiting the supply of ex-
perts effectively increases the fees that those experts can command).
In order to recover, plaintiffs must prove "negligence"-that their
providers failed to exercise due care. As always, the plaintiff must establish
the four elements of a tort lawsuit: (1) duty, (2) breach, (3) proximate
cause, and (4) damages. "Duty" means that there was a relationship be-
tween patient and provider sufficient to trigger an obligation to exercise
due care in the treatment of the patient. (Most of the time, duty is a non-
issue, particularly if there is a pre-existing relationship between provider
and patient.) "Breach" means that the provider failed to exercise the care
expected of a reasonably skilled provider. Establishing breach requires
expert testimony, since the touchstone for establishing liability is proof of a
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deviation from the standard of care. (In some states, customary treatment is
by definition not negligent, but most states have moved to a more demand-
ing standard.)7 "Proximate cause" means that the breach of the standard of
care was the cause in fact of compensable injury. Thus, injuries that are too
remotely related to the alleged cause cannot result in compensation.
Causation often involves complicated issues, which is part of the rea-
son that malpractice litigation is expensive. Indeed, for most malpractice
cases, causation is the primary issue in dispute. Many states allow for re-
covery of "lost chance," but there is variation in how large the chance must
be. Similarly, although all states allow for recovery if the physician has not
obtained informed consent, such cases are not usually sufficiently remuner-
ative for them to be brought, barring exceptional circumstances.8
In all states, the plaintiff bears the burden of proof on all issues (i.e.,
they must prove their position is "more likely than not"). If the plaintiff is
seeking punitive damages, many states impose a higher burden of proof
("clear and convincing evidence") and other procedural barriers. There are
also constitutional limitations on the size of punitive damages (they must
generally be less than ten times the compensatory damages) and the pro-
cesses employed to determine whether such damages are appropriate. 9 To
be sure, punitive damages are not that common in medical malpractice
cases, occurring in fewer than 5 percent of tried and settled cases.10
Compensatory damages take two forms: economic (e.g., lost earnings
and medical bills), and non-economic (e.g., pain and suffering). Proving
damages is generally straightforward for economic losses, but can be diffi-
cult or contentious when parties disagree about patients' future earnings or
the severity or likely duration of patients' disabilities. Non-economic dam-
ages are more speculative, but they are strongly correlated with economic
damages. 1
7. Philip G. Peters, The Quiet Demise of Deference to Custom: Malpractice Law at the Millenni-
um, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 163, 170, 188 (2000).
8. David M. Studdert et al., Claims, Errors, and Compensation Payments in Medical Malprac-
tice, 354 NEw ENG. J. MED. 2024, 2026 (2006).
9. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003); Nitin Sud, Puni-
tive Damages: Achieving Fairness and Consistency after State Farm v. Campbell, 72 DEF. COUNS. J.
67, 77 (2005).
10. See THOMAS H. COHEN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ No. 203098, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
TRIALS AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES, 2001 2 (2004), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/mmtvlcOl.pdf; Bernard Black et al., Stability, Not Crisis:





Criminal liability for malpractice is extraordinarily rare. (One of us re-
ferred to it elsewhere as "the unicorn" of malpractice policy).1 2 The deci-
sion to initiate such cases lies with prosecutors at the county, state, and
federal level, some of whom are elected. When such cases are brought, they
are often the result of a highly visible death that resulted from egregious
misconduct. For example, a pharmacist who diluted chemotherapy drugs
was criminally prosecuted and sentenced to prison.13 A less clear-cut sce-
nario involves physicians who practice pain management, and were prose-
cuted for writing "excess" prescriptions after patients overdosed or were
caught selling the pharmaceuticals.14 Finally, nurses have been prosecuted
for criminal negligence following the administration of an incorrect dose or
the wrong medicine to a patient that subsequently died.' 5
In some instances, civil fraud claims are brought against physicians
for conduct that could also be characterized as malpractice. Such claims are
often initiated by whistle-blowers, who receive a share of any proceeds. For
example, after two whistle-blowers filed complaints, the Department of
Justice pursued False Claims Act litigation against two physicians and a
hospital for performing unnecessary surgery. In this case, individual plain-
tiffs also brought malpractice claims against the physicians and hospital.
Even though the facts were quite egregious, criminal charges were not
brought, and there was a package settlement of the malpractice and civil
False Claims Act claims.16
Dissatisfied patients have two primary means of complaining. They
can contact the relevant state's licensing board, which may revoke or limit
the licenses of physicians found to have acted improperly. The utility of
this mechanism varies greatly from state to state-some are much more
likely to initiate disciplinary proceedings against individual physicians than
others-but speaking generally it seems that only the most egregious cases
are likely to interest state medical boards.17
12. See David A. Hyman, Collateral Damage, 27 HEALTH AFF. 1476, 1477 (2008).
13. Pam Belluck, Prosecutors Say Greed Drove Pharmacist to Dilute Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
18, 2001, available at http://www.nvtines.com/2001/08/18/us/Prosecutors-say-greed-drove-pharmacist-
to-dilute-drugs.html; National Briefing I Midwest: Missouri: 30-Year Sentence For Druggist, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 6, 2002, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/06/us/national-briefing-midwest-
missouri-30-year-sentence-for-druggist.html.
14. Marc Kaufman, DEA Revises Rule on Prescribing Painkillers, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 2006,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/09/06/AR2006090601756.html.
15. Rebecca Cady, Criminal Prosecution for Nursing Errors, II JONA's Healthcare Law, Ethics
and Regulation 10 (Jan-Mar. 2009).
16. STEPHEN KLAIDMAN, CORONARY: A TRUE STORY OF MEDICINE GONE AWRY 261-81 (2007).
17. See generally LEVINE ET AL., supra note 6.
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Dissatisfied patients can also sue, when they can find lawyers willing
to represent them. Securing a recovery when liability is contested is all but
impossible without help from a plaintiffs' lawyer.' 8 Obtaining counsel is
harder than one might imagine. Because plaintiffs' lawyers work on con-
tingency, they screen cases carefully and decline most requests for repre-
sentation. One study found that a plaintiffs' law firm declined twenty-nine
of thirty requests for representation, a 97 percent rejection rate, and also
paid independent physician-experts to review the cases it took.19 Once
cases are accepted, plaintiffs' lawyers research claims extensively using
compulsory process, and they frequently drop cases when new information
creates doubt about the merits.
In exchange for accepting a case, a plaintiffs' lawyer will typically
demand a contingent fee of one-third or more of any proceeds plus any
expenses incurred. If the case is unsuccessful, the plaintiff need not pay
anything. Health insurers who paid for post-injury treatment are entitled to
reimbursement out of the proceeds of any malpractice claim. In practice,
this means that plaintiffs often walk away with less than half the amount
recovered.
When there is a payment, it is most often the result of a voluntary set-
tlement. Relatively few claims (5-10 percent) go to trial, and when the case
is tried, defendant-physicians win 75-80 percent of the time. Although the
physician is the named defendant, the real party in interest is almost always
a private malpractice insurer (from whom the physician has purchased a
policy). Physicians rarely use personal assets to satisfy malpractice
claims.20 As a practical matter, the stakes in malpractice suits are capped
by the limits of physicians' insurance coverage, regardless of the severity
of patients' injuries or the amounts that juries believe patients ought to
receive.21
Federal law requires insurance companies and other entities to report
payouts in malpractice cases to the National Practitioner Data Bank
(NPDB). Although researchers use the NPDB to study trends in malprac-
18. Charles Silver & David A. Hyman, Access to Justice in a World Without Lawyers: Evidence
from Texas Bodily Injury Claims, 37 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 357, 373-74 (2010).
19. LaRae 1. Huycke & Mark M. Huycke, Characteristics of Potential Plaintiffs in Malpractice
Litigation, 120 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 792, 796 (1994).
20. Kathryn Zeiler et al., Physicians' Insurance Limits and Malpractice Payments: Evidence from
Texas Closed Claims 1990-2003, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 9, 11 (2007).
21. David A. Hyman et al., Do Defendants Pay What Juries Award? Post- Verdict Haircuts in
Texas Medical Malpractice Cases, 1988-2003, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 3, 53 (2007); Charles
Silver et al., Malpractice Payouts and Malpractice Insurance: Evidence from Texas Closed Claims,
1990-2003, 33 THE GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS.-ISSUES & PRACTICE 177, 188 (2008); Zeiler et
al., supra note 20, at 10.
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tice cases and other matters, neither providers nor regulators appear to use
the information it contains to improve quality of care or reduce the fre-
quency of medical errors. State laws require hospitals to report hospital-
acquired conditions, including injuries patient suffer as a result of medical
mistakes, but under-reporting is rampant. One report found the 90'percent
of errors went unreported.22
In most states, clinical practice guidelines have not played a material
role in malpractice litigation. Such guidelines can serve as either a sword
(where deviation from the guideline is deemed to create a prima facie or
per se case of malpractice) or a shield (where compliance with the guide-
line eliminates the possibility of liability). One scholar recently proposed
that providers should be immune from civil liability when they comply
with treatment guidelines promulgated by private entities, but the private
entities would be liable if their guidelines were negligently constructed.23
2. No-Fault Liability (Strict Liability)
No-fault liability for medical error has proven far more popular with
academics than with legislators. There are only a few pockets of strict-
liability for medical malpractice in the United States. Qualifying birth inju-
ry cases in Virginia and Florida are excluded from the tort system, and are
handled through an administrative system. Ironically, plaintiffs with strong
cases prefer to litigate in the tort system, since they can recover a greater
amount, while plaintiffs with weak cases prefer the no-fault system. Prod-
ucts liability cases involving medical devices (whether the plaintiff is alleg-
ing design or manufacturing defect) also qualify for strict liability
treatment.
Vaccine injury cases are handled by the U.S. Court of Federal Claims.
The 1986 National Vaccine Injury Act created a no-fault system for han-
dling such claims. Claimants must show that they experienced one of sev-
eral enumerated adverse effects shortly after vaccination. The burden of
proof is the same as in civil litigation-more likely than not. Compensation
covers medical and legal expenses, loss of future earning capacity, and up
to $250,000 for pain and suffering. There is also a death benefit of up to
$250,000. Legal expenses may be compensated as well. The program is
funded by an excise tax on every purchased dose of covered vaccine.24
22. David C. Classen et al., "Global Trigger Tool" Shows That Adverse Events In Hospitals May
Be Ten Times Greater Than Previously Measured, 30 HEALTH AFF. 581, 586 (2011).
23. Ronen Avraham, Private and Competitive Regulation of Medicine, 6 THE ECONOMISTS'
VOICE 2,3-4 (2009), available at http://www.bepress.com/ev/vol6/iss8/art2.
24. See Stephen D. Sugarman, Cases in Vaccine Court-Legal Battles over Vaccines and Autism,
357 NEw ENGL. J. MED. 1275, 1276 (2007).
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C. Limitations on Liability/Contracting out ofLiability
As noted previously, many states cap liability exposure for either non-
economic or total damages. Table 2 contains a list of these states, and out-
lines the details of the applicable caps. As Table 2 reflects, there is consid-
erable variation in the design of these caps. We recently published a paper
estimating the effect of each of these caps using a common set of cases, and
found extraordinary variation in the likely impact. 25 Total damages caps
had the largest impact, other design details (e.g., the level of the cap, and
whether it scaled based on the number of defendants) mattered as well.
TABLE 2. STATE DAMAGES CAPS
STATE CAP TYPE CAP LEVEL
Louisiana Total $500,000 plus future medical expenses
New Mexico Total $600,000 plus future medical expenses
Colorado Total, non-economic $1 million total; $300,000 non-economic
Indiana Total $1.25 million
Massachusetts Total (hospitals); non- $20,000 total (non-profit hospitals);
economic (all) $500,000 non-economic (all defendants)
Nebraska Total $1.75 million





West Virginia* Non-economic $250,000, except $500,000 in death cases
Oklahoma* Non-economic $300,000
Texas Non-economic $250,000-$750,000, depending on number
and type of defendants
Nevada Non-economic $350,000
Ohio Non-economic Greater of $250,000 or three times economic
damages, up to $500,000
Hawaii Non-economic $375,000
Georgia Non-economic $350,000-$1.05 million, depending on num-
ber and type of defendants
South Carolina Non-economic $350,000-$1.05 million, depending on num-
25. David A. Hyman et al., Estimating the Effect of Damage Caps in Medical Malpractice Cases:
Evidence from Texas, I J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 355, 405-06 (2009).
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North Dakota Non-economic $500,000
South Dakota Non-economic $500,000
Maryland* Non-economic $650,000
Missouri Non-economic $350,000




Source: See David A. Hyman et al., Estimating the Effect of Damage Caps in Medical Mal-
practice Cases: Evidence from Texas, I J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 355 (2009).
There has been considerable academic interest in contracting out of li-
ability. Courts have proven considerably less enthusiastic about such con-
tracts, striking them down on various grounds. However, many states allow
contracting into arbitration, or some other form of alternative dispute reso-
lution, as long as certain procedural protections are provided.
D. Immunity from Liability
Federal law eliminates liability for service providers who serve as
volunteers in nonprofit institutions, including but not limited to free clinics,
as long as the harm was not caused by willful or criminal misconduct, gross
negligence, reckless misconduct, or a conscious, flagrant indifference to the
rights or safety of the individual harmed by the volunteer. Historically,
many states provided for absolute immunity of nonprofit hospitals ("chari-
table immunity"). Charitable immunity has been almost entirely abrogated,
although Massachusetts retains a very low cap on damages in cases involv-
ing nonprofit hospitals.
Federal law also exempts doctors and nurses who treat military per-
sonnel at hospitals run by the Veterans Administration. Injured patients can
receive compensations from the hospitals, however.
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II. EMPIRICAL DATA ON MEDICAL ERRORS/ADVERSE EVENTS AND
MALPRACTICE LITIGATION
The empirical literature on medical errors/adverse events and malprac-
tice litigation is vast. We address each issue in turn.
A. How Common Are Medical Errors and Adverse Events?
In 2001, the Institute of Medicine made front-page news by estimating
that medical errors kill 44,000 to 98,000 hospitalized patients annually and
injure many more. 26 Recent studies put the number of deaths much high-
er.27 One source, which studied Medicare patients treated in hospitals from
2000-2002, estimated that almost 195,000 deaths each year "were poten-
tially attributable to . . . patient safety incident[s]." 28 Depending on the
source, medical error is the eighth-, sixth-, or third-leading cause of death
in the U.S.29
Fatal injuries are only the tip of the adverse event/medical error ice-
berg, since over a million people are injured by medical treatments annual-
ly in the U.S. One study concluded that medical errors and quality
problems in outpatient care resulted in "116 million extra physician visits,
77 million extra prescriptions, 17 million emergency department visits, 8
million hospitalizations, 3 million long-term admissions [and] 199,000
additional deaths." 30 1.7 million hospitalized patients acquire infections,
many of which are preventable, each year. Researchers estimate that ap-
proximately 51 million prescriptions filled nationwide contained some type
of error, including 3 million mistakes that were potentially harmful. Ad-
verse drug events (ADEs) are estimated to result in more than 770,000
injuries and deaths each year. A study by the HHS Inspector General con-
cluded that 13.5 percent of hospitalized Medicare beneficiaries experienced
adverse events during their hospital stays, with 44 percent of these events
26. INST. OF MEDICINE, To ERR Is HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 31 (Linda T.
Kohn et al. eds., 2000).
27. See, e.g., Classen et al., supra note 22, at 586; HEALTHGRADES, PATIENT SAFETY IN
AMERICAN HOSPITALS 1 (2004) (180,000 deaths at least partly attributable to health care), available at
http://www.healthgrades.com/media/english/pdflHG PatientSafety StudyFinal.pdf.
28. Id.
29. David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, The Poor State of Health Care Quality in the U.S.: Is
Malpractice Liability Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?, 90 CORNELL L. REv. 893, 901
(2005).
30. Barbara Starfield, Is US Health Really the Best in the World?, 284 JAMA 483, 484 (2000).
2012] 175
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
"clearly or likely preventable." 31 The OIG estimated that these adverse
events cost the Medicare program roughly $4.4 billion in 2008.
Articles published in a 2011 theme issue of Health Affairs provide a
comprehensive portrait of medical injuries and their associated costs. One
study finds that a commonly used approach for identifying mistakes cap-
tures only one-tenth of the serious adverse events that occurred in hospi-
tals.32 Using a new method, the Global Trigger Tool developed by the In-
Institute for Healthcare Improvement, the authors found that adverse events
occurred in a shocking 33.2 percent of hospital admissions. 33 A second
study, which relied on claims data, found that medical errors generate over
$17 billion in direct medical costs. 34 A third study attempted to quantify the
total social cost of medical errors based on the amounts people are willing
to pay to avoid risks to their health. It found that medical errors, which
account for 187,000 deaths in hospitals and 6.1 million injuries, entail an
annual social cost ranging from $393 billion to $958 billion.35
No matter how one slices the data, or where one looks, the evidence is
clear that medical errors and adverse events are distressingly common in
the U.S. Some of these incidents are attributable to incompe-
tence/inattention by an individual named physician, but many more are the
result of systems-level failings, whose frequency is elevated because of the
fragmented nature of the U.S. health care system.
B. Malpractice Litigation
The malpractice system deals with medical errors/adverse events after
they occur-although it is supposed to create an ex ante incentive to avoid
such outcomes. There are many excellent literature reviews of the perfor-
mance of the medical malpractice system, including several recent book-
length treatments. 36 We focus here on the frequency of claiming; compen-
31. DEP'T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ADVERSE EVENTS IN HOSPITALS: NATIONAL
INCIDENCE AMONG MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES 15, 22 (2010), available at
http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-06-09-00090.pdf
32. Classen et al., supra note 22, at 586.
33. Cheryl Clark, I in 3 Hospitalized Patients Suffers an Adverse Event, HEALTHLEADERS MEDIA
(Apr. 7, 2011), available at littp://www.healthleadersmedia.com/print/OUA-264653/1-in-3-
Hospitalized-Patients-Suffers-an-Adverse-Event.
34. Jill Van Den Bos et al., The $17.1 Billion Problem: The Annual Cost Of Measurable Medical
Errors, 30 HEALTH AFF. 596, 602 (2011).
35. John C. Goodman et al., The Social Cost Of Adverse Medical Events, And What We Can Do
About It, 30 HEALTH AFF. 590, 591, 593 (2011).
36. See generally TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH (2005); see also FRANK A.
SLOAN & LINDSEY M. CHEPKE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (2008).
176 [Vol 87:1
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE
sation patterns (including the efficiency with which the liability system
sorts cases); and time trends in claiming and payouts.
1. Claiming Frequency (relative to rate of medical error/adverse
events)
Although the conventional wisdom is that Americans are exceptional-
ly litigious, there is evidence that "Americans are no more innately lawsuit
prone than the Japanese, the supposed saints of non-litigiousness." 37 Stud-
ies of patients injured by medical malpractice indicate that "the great ma-
jority of patients who sustain a medical injury as a result of negligence do
not sue." 38 One researcher estimates that ten to twenty claims are asserted
for every 100 malpractice-related injuries. 39 Rather than show that Ameri-
cans sue too often, "the medical setting has provided the strongest evidence
that the real tort crisis may consist in too few claims." 40
The first major study, which focused on patients hospitalized in Cali-
fornia in 1974, estimated that negligent injuries exceeded malpractice
claims by a factor of ten.41 Later studies, which focused on patients hospi-
talized in New York and Colorado/Utah, found ratios of negligent injuries
37. Thomas F. Burke, LAWYERS, LAWSUITS, AND LEGAL RIGHTS: THE BATTLE OVER LITIGATION
IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 3 (2002).
38. Studdert et al., supra note 8, at 2025.
39. Michael J. Saks, Medical Malpractice . .. By the Numbers, in LITIGATING MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE CLAIMS 399,401 (ALI-ABA, 2008).
40. PAUL C. WElLER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE: MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE
LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION 62 (1993) (reporting results of an extensive study of mal-
practice in New York hospitals); see also Lori B. Andrews, Studying Medical Error in Situ: Implica-
tions for Malpractice Law and Policy, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 357, 370 (2005).
41. Don Harper Mills, Medical Insurance Feasibility Study-A Technical Summary, 128 WEST. J.
MED. 360, 362-64 (1978); see also CALIFORNIA MED. Ass'N & CALIFORNIA HoSP. ASS'N, REPORT ON
THE MEDICAL INSURANCE FEASIBILITY STUDY (Don H. Mills ed., 1977); PATRICIA M. DANZON,
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 66 (1985).
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to lawsuits roughly in the range of 5-7:1.42 Other sources also find that
injuries greatly outnumber lawsuits.43
Looking outside of peer-reviewed journals, one finds ample evidence
that the frequency of errors greatly exceeds the number of claims. At the
national level, in 2000 there were roughly 87,000 medical malpractice law-
suits filed-but that figure is less than the IOM's upper-end estimate of a
modest subset of medical errors (i.e., those that result in death).44 At the
state level, in 2009, a Florida agency received reports of 4,137 injury inci-
dents from medical facilities but the number of new malpractice claims was
only 855.45 The same pattern is replicated in earlier years.46 Finally, a study
of 1,047 patients at a Chicago hospital found that although 17.7 percent
experienced "one or more errors with a serious injury," only thirty nine (3.7
percent) requested their medical records, only five (<0.5 percent) sent let-
ters of complaint, and only thirteen (1.2 percent) brought a claim. 47
2. Compensation Patterns and Time Trends
Empirical studies of those who initiate malpractice claims show that
injuries tend to be severe, that the size of payouts correlates with injury
severity (other than a "death-discount"), that patients are under-
compensated, and that the patients who suffer the worst injuries recover the
42. On New York, see PAUL C. WEILER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL 12 (1991); WElLER ET
AL., supra note 40; Troyen A. Brennan et al., Incidence of Adverse Events and Negligence in Hospital-
ized Patients. Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study 1, 324 NEw. ENG. J. MED. 370 (1991);
Lucian L. Leape et al., The Nature of Adverse Events in Hospitalized Patients. Results of the Harvard
Medical Practice Study II, 324 NEw ENG. J. MED. 377 (1991); A. Russell Localio et al., Relation Be-
tween Malpractice Claims and Adverse Events Due to Negligence. Results of the Harvard Medical
Practice Study III., 325 NEW ENG. J MED. 245 (1991). On Colorado and Utah, see David M. Studdert et
al., Beyond Dead Reckoning: Measures of Medical Injury Burden, Malpractice Litigation, and Alterna-
tive Compensation Models from Utah and Colorado, 33 IND. L. REv. 1643, 1664 (2000); Eric J. Thom-
as et al., Costs of Medical Injuries in Utah and Colorado, 36 INQUIRY 255 (1999); Eric J. Thomas et al.,
Incidence and Types ofAdverse Events and Negligent Care in Utah and Colorado, 38 MED. CARE 261
(2000).
43. Frank A. Sloan & Chee Ruey Hsieh, Injury, Liability and the Decision to File a Medical
Malpractice Claim, 29 L. & SOC. REv. 413, 414 (1995); Lori B. Andrews et al., An Alternative Strategy
for Studying Adverse Events in Medical Care, 349 LANCET 309, 312 (1997).
44. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS, STATISTICAL COMPILATION OF
ANNUAL STATEMENT INFORMATION FOR PROPERTY/CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANIES (2001).
45. FLORIDA AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, 2009 MALPRACTICE STATEWIDE
(2009), available at
http://www.fdhc.state.fl.us/SCHS/risk/documents/2009/2009MalpracticeStatewide.pdf
46. FLORIDA AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, REPORTED MALPRACTICE CLAIMS
STATEWIDE COMPARED TO REPORTED ADVERSE INCIDENTS 2006 (2006), available at
http://www.fdhc.state.fl.us/SCHS/risk/documents/2006RepMalpClaimsState-
WideComptoAnnualReplncidents.pdf.
47. Andrews, supra note 40, at 370; see also Andrews et al., supra note 43, at 311-12.
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smallest portions of their losses. 48 Comparing plaintiffs' economic losses-
mainly, their past and future medical costs and their lost wages or expected
income-to the amounts they received, one study found that malpractice
victims "tended to be under-compensated, and [that] the fraction of loss
recovered tended to be less for the most severe injuries and for deaths, in
particular for infants." 49
Injury severity is often ranked on a 9-level scale developed by the Na-
tional Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC). The lowest rank-
ings, 1-4, are for less serious injuries from which people usually recover,
such as bums, infections, scars, and emotional harms. Levels 5-8 are for
permanent injuries, which range from minor (loss of fingers or other non-
disabling injuries) to grave (quadriplegia, severe brain damage, or fatal
prognosis). The highest ranking, 9, is used when the victim died.50
Malpractice actions tend to involve injuries with high NAIC scores.
Table 3 compares the distribution of injuries in closed malpractice claim
databases maintained by Florida, Illinois, and Missouri, and the payouts for
injuries with the specified NAIC scores. 51
TABLE 3. NUMBER AND MEDIAN PAYOUT OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
INSURANCE CLAIMS, BY SEVERITY OF INJURY, FROM 2000-2004
NAIC
Scale NAIC Description Florida Illinois Missouri
Number Median Num- Median Num Median
Duration Seventy Payout ber Payout ber Payout
Emo-
to- 206 $25k 48 $26k 17 $33k1 tional
2 Slight 369 $16k 86 $5k 25 $16k
Tempo-
3 Minor 1,371 $50k 452 $25k 130 $64krary
4 Major 842 $79k 308 $48k 207 $210k
5 Minor 1,406 $108k 346 $83k 259 $220k
Perma- Sig-
nent nifica 860 $250k 255 $210k 243 $400k
6 nt I I
48. David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, Medical Malpractice Litigation and Tort Reform: It's the
Incentives, Stupid, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1085, 1104-05 (2006).
49. Frank A. Sloan, Policy Implications, in SUING FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 211, 220 (Frank
A. Sloan et al. eds., 1993).
50. Whether the NAIC scale accurately tracks human assessments of injury severity is unclear.
Injuries classified as minor or temporary on the NAIC's 9-level scale may seem serious when examined
closely. See Allen J. Hart et al., Multidimensional Perceptions of Illness and Injury, 2 CURRENT RES.
SOC. PSYCHOL. 30 (Sept. 11, 1997), available at http://www.uiowa.edu/-grpproc/crisp/crisp.2.4.htm.
51. THOMAS H. COHEN & KRISTEN A. HUGHES U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE CLAIMS IN SEVEN STATES, 2000-2004 6 (2007).
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7 Major 591 $321k 193 $350k 225 $618k
8 Grave 424 $278k 99 $333k 152 $989k
9 Death 2,450 $216k 811 $172k 687 $457k
All Temporary Non-fatal 2,582 $50k 846k $28k 362 $124k
Injuries I I
All Permanent Non-fatal 3,281 $210k 893k $193k 879 $420k
Injuries
Total 8519 $133k 2,598 $107k 1945 $350k
Insurance payouts were adjusted for inflation using the consumer Price Index (CPI) in 2004 dol-
lars. See Consumer Price Index, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, http://www.bls.gov/cpi/ (last
visited Oct. 5, 2011).
Death cases account for roughly one-third of the claims in each state.
In combination, death cases and cases with permanent non-fatal injuries
constitute 66-80 percent of each dataset. The closed claim database assem-
bled for the 2006 Harvard study had a similar injury distribution. 52
Table 3 shows that payouts increase as injuries become more severe.
In all three states, the median payouts for claims with temporary injuries
are considerably smaller than those for permanent injuries. The relationship
is not linear within the permanent injury category. Injuries with lower
NAIC rankings sometimes have higher median payouts than more serious
injuries. In all three states, injuries with NAIC rankings of 6-8 also gener-
ate higher median payouts than death cases. A study of paid claims by chil-
dren against emergency department physicians found the same pattern:
payments increased with injury severity until the injury was death, at which
point payouts declined.53 These results are not surprising. The liability
system compensates proven economic and non-economic damages, subject
to any caps the state may impose. Injury severity and damages do not al-
ways correlate. For example, death is at the high end of severity, but not of
damages. Injuries with long-term consequences, such as ongoing needs for
health care services, entail higher costs and generate higher payouts.
Studies of tried malpractice cases turn up the same patterns: serious
injuries predominate and verdicts generally track injury severity. Using a
sample of medical malpractice trials drawn from large counties nationwide,
the Bureau of Justice Statistics found that 90 percent of medical malprac-
52. Studdert et al., supra note 8, at 2026 ("Eighty percent of claims involved injuries that caused
significant or major disability (39 percent and 15 percent, respectively) or death (26 percent).").
53. Steven M. Selbst et al., Epidemiology and Etiology of Malpractice Lawsuits Involving Chil-
dren in US Emergency Departments and Urgent Care Centers, 21 PEDIATRIC EMERGENCY CARE 165,
165-69 (2005).
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tice trials involved plaintiffs who claimed malpractice had caused death or
permanent injury.54 The BJS also quantified how injury severity affected
damages awards: "Median award amounts for medical malpractice trials
arising from death claims ($837k) and permanent injuries ($412k) were
higher than the median awards for medical malpractice trials that stemmed
from temporary injuries ($77k)." 55 "[N]o patient with a temporary injury
received an award exceeding $1 million from a jury." 56
A study of California jury verdicts with large non-economic awards
also reported that serious injuries predominated and that verdicts varied
with injury severity: "[I]n general, plaintiffs' injuries were severe: Approx-
imately half resulted in death, grave injury, or major injury. No claims
involved emotional or insignificant injury exclusively, and only 3 percent
involved temporary minor injury."57 Non-economic damages and the
chance of a multi-million dollar verdict correlated strongly with injury
severity.
How are payouts changing over time? One often hears that payments
on malpractice claims have skyrocketed. This assertion is sometimes sup-
ported by unrepresentative anecdotes or by industry-supported studies that
use unpublished data and that fail to adjust for inflation or changes in the
mix of injuries. Better studies find that payments are stable or declining.
For example, the Missouri Department of Insurance examined 6,694 mal-
practice claims that closed with payments from 1990-2001. Using a time
series regression model that controlled for health care inflation, real wages,
and injury severity, the model showed that Missouri's liability system be-
came stingier over time. "Without increases in health care costs and aver-
age wages, and if injury severities remained constant, average payments
would have decreased fairly significantly during the 1990s."58 A subse-
quent study of claims closed 1990-2006 revealed that claim frequency was
54. COHEN, supra note 9; THOMAS H. COHEN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ NO. 206240, TORT
TRIALS AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES, 2001 5 (2004). The BJS data includes separate variables
for permanence of injury and seriousness of injury. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Unintended Conse-
quences of Medical Malpractice Damages Caps, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 391, 505 n.456 (2005).
55. COHEN, supra note 10, at 2.
56. Id.
57. David M. Studdert et al., Are Damages Caps Regressive? A Study of Malpractice Jury Ver-
dicts in California, 23 HEALTH AFF. 54, 57 (2004).
58. MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE IN MISSOURI:





also stable or declining.59 The study did not control for increases in the
volume of health care services delivered--even though from 1991-2004,
total health care spending almost doubled.
A study of Florida closed claims found that claim frequency held level
from 1990-1997, averaging about 2,600 claims per year.60 Paid claims,
however, grew in number from 1990-2003, roughly in line with Florida's
rising population but more slowly than Florida's supply of physicians. Paid
claims per 100 doctors fell from 3.98 in 1990 to 3.33 in 2002; mean and
median payments for claims with a positive payout increased substantially.
The number of $1 million payments also increased. The authors attributed
the increase in payment size to a significant increase in the severity of the
injuries, and to larger awards within injury severity categories, possibly
driven by the growing cost of health care.
Another team of authors evaluated trends in claims and payments by
drawing on reports of malpractice settlements filed with the National Prac-
titioner Databank (NPDB) between 1991 and 2003.61 Their sample con-
tained 184,506 reports concerning physicians in all fifty states. They found
that the frequency of paid claims was stable. The number of payments per
100k persons fell slightly, from 5.2 to 5.0. Real payout increased 52 per-
cent, an average of 4 percent per year. Most of the growth was concentrated
in claims with payments below the top 10 percent of the distribution.
Another set of authors studied payments on malpractice claims involv-
ing urologists in New York State. 62 They examined 469 claims closed from
1985-2004. The number of files averaged twenty-two per year and showed
no time trend, but the inflation-adjusted average indemnity payment in-
creased by 191 percent over the period they studied. Because the sample
included only claims against urologists practicing in New York State, it
seems unlikely that changes in the case mix account for the increase. How-
ever, results controlling for case characteristics were not reported.
Finally, another team of authors calculated physician malpractice lia-
bility per $lk in health care expenditures (measured two ways), and
showed that the ratio changed little over time. The stability of the ratio led
59. MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, AND PROFESSIONAL
REGISTRATION, MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY INSURANCE CLAIM REPORT (2006), available at
http://www.insurance.mo.gov/industry/forms/375-0304.pdf.
60. Neil Vidmar et al, Uncovering the "Invisible" Profile of Medical Malpractice Litigation:
Insights from Florida, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 315, 332, 336, 348 (2005).
61. Amitabh Chandra et al., The Growth of Physician Medical Malpractice Payments: Evidence
from the National Practitioner Data Bank, HEALTH AFF. W5-240, 243 (2005) (web exclusive) availa-
ble at http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/early/2005/05/3 1/hlthaff.w5.240.citation.
62. Michael Perrotti et al., Medical Malpractice in Urology, 1985 to 2004: 469 Consecutive Cases
Closed with Indemnity Payment, 176 J. UROLOGY 2154, 54-57 (2006).
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them to conclude that "rising medical costs, which contribute to the size of
compensatory awards, may explain a sizable portion of payment growth,
consistent with other findings." 63
What of jury verdicts? Although one often hears that jury verdicts
have skyrocketed and vary irrationally, "[s]cholarly work on trends in jury
verdict awards ... generally finds little support for the more pessimistic
view of runaway juries and increasingly generous awards."M The research
is well known and has been summarized many times. 65 We focus on the
most recent studies.
In 2004, the Institute for Civil Justice at RAND released an impressive
study of jury verdicts in tort cases. 66 The authors compiled a database of
jury verdicts covering a span of forty years (1960-1999) from state courts
in San Francisco County, California and Cook County, Illinois. Their
sources were jury verdict reporters in both states. The dataset included "all
medical malpractice, other professional malpractice, product liability, au-
tomobile, common carrier, and premises liability verdicts, as well as other
tort cases such as civil rights cases and intentional torts." 67 Looking at only
trials with verdicts for plaintiffs, the RAND study found a substantial in-
crease in the real average award and a smaller increase in the real median
award. However, "case characteristics, claimed nonmedical economic loss-
es, and claimed medical losses account[ed] for essentially all the observed
growth in average tort awards in San Francisco County and Cook County
over this time period." 68
This study did not distinguish verdicts from payments. Yet, when ju-
rors award plaintiffs large amounts of money, defendants rarely pay the full
amount. Verdicts are often adjusted downwards because of judicial remit-
titur, private pre-judgment contracts between the parties (called "high/low
63. Chandra et al., supra note 61, at 247.
64. Seth A. Seabury et al., Forty Years of Civil Jury Verdicts, I J. OF EMPIRICAL LEG. STUD. 1, 2
(2004); see also Philip G. Peters Jr., Health Courts, 88 B.U. L. Rev. 227, 38-41 (2008).
65. The seminal writings on jury verdicts in malpractice cases include publications by Neil
Vidmar, Stephen Daniels, Joanne Martin, and Thomas Metzloff. NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN JURY: CONFRONTING THE MYTHS ABOUT JURY INCOMPETENCE,
DEEP POCKETS, AND OUTRAGEOUS DAMAGE AWARDS (1995); Neil Vidmar, Empirical Evidence on the
Deep Pockets Hypothesis: Jury Awards for Pain and Suffering in Medical Malpractice Cases, 43 DUKE
L.J. 217, 254-55 (1993); Neil Vidmar, Felicia Gross & Mary Rose, Jury Awards for Medical Malprac-
tice and Post-verdict Adjustments of Those Awards, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 265, 280, 298 (1998); see also
STEPHEN DANIELS & JOANNE MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES AND THE POLITICS OF REFORM (1995); Thomas B.
Metzloff, Resolving Malpractice Disputes: Imaging the Jury's Shadow, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
43, 74-75, 83 n.126 (1991). For a recent review, see generally Shari Seidman Diamond, Beyond Fanta-
sy and Nightmare: A Portrait ofthe Jury, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 717 (2006).
66. Seabury et al., supra note 64, at 2.
67. Id. at 4.
68. Id. at 20.
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agreements," which may sometimes increase payments as well), as part of
settlement negotiations to avoid an appeal, or simply because defendants
have limited insurance, and it isn't worth pursuing "blood money." As
verdict size increases, downward post-verdict adjustments become both
more likely and bigger. The first studies comparing verdicts and payments
appeared in the 1990s. 69 These studies found that large verdicts were re-
duced substantially, with defendants often paying but a small fraction of
jury awards. More recently, Vidmar has produced single-state reports cov-
ering Florida, Illinois, and Pennsylvania. 70 These reports find that defend-
ants usually paid much less than juries awarded when verdicts exceeded $1
million.
Research on closed malpractice claims in Texas also finds that plain-
tiffs discount verdicts significantly when settling, and that plaintiffs with
the largest verdicts incur the largest reductions, in both percentage terms
and absolute dollars.7 ' Seventy-five percent of plaintiffs received payouts
below their verdicts (adjusted for pre- and post-judgment interest). The
mean (median) discount per case was 29 percent (19 percent), and the ag-
gregate reduction for all plaintiffs who won at trial was 56 percent.
3. Impact of Caps on Non-Economic Damages
A sizeable empirical literature studies the impact of non-economic
caps on verdicts, claim frequency, malpractice insurance payouts, malprac-
tice premiums, defensive medicine, physician supply, overall health insur-
ance premiums, mortality rates, and more. Some studies are peer reviewed,
but many findings appear in government reports, non-peer reviewed jour-
nals, and policy papers. Recent reviews of this literature are easily found.72
This discussion therefore focuses on the small number of peer-reviewed
studies of caps of all types that is based on case- or claim-level data. These
69. Vidmar, Gross & Rose, supra note 65, at 280, 298.
70. Neil Vidmar et al., Million Dollar Medical Malpractice Cases in Florida: Post- Verdict and
Pre-Suit Settlements, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1343 (2006); NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
LITIGATION IN PENNSYLVANIA (2006), available at
http://www.pabar.org/pdf/PBAMedMalweb061406.pdf; NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND
THE TORT SYSTEM IN ILLINOIS (2005), available at webarchives.isba.org/medicalmalpracticestudy.pdf
71. David A. Hyman et al., Estimating The Effect of Damages Caps in Medical Malpractice
Cases: Evidence from Texas, I J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 355, 384-85 (2009).
72. See Leonard J. Nelson III et al., Medical Malpractice Reform in Three Southern States, J. OF
HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 69 (2008); Leonard J. Nelson III et al., Damages Caps in Medical Malprac-
tice Cases, 85 MILBANK Q. 259 (2007); John J. Donohue III & Daniel E. Ho, The Impact of Damage
Caps on Malpractice Claims: Randomization Inference with Difference-in-Differences, 4 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 69 (2007); MICHELLE M. MELLO, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: IMPACT OF THE CRISIS AND
EFFECT OF STATE TORT REFORMS (2006), available at http://rwjforg/pr/product.jsp?id=15168; Geof-
frey Christopher Rapp, Doctors, Duties, Death and Data: A Critical Review of the Empirical Literature
on Medical Malpractice and Tort Reform, 26 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 439 (2006).
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studies find that caps have the effect one would predict: they cut deeply
into verdicts with sizeable awards of non-economic damages.
California's Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA) stat-
ute capped non-economic damages at $250,000 in 1975. However, because
the allowed amount is not adjusted for inflation, the MICRA cap is much
less generous now than when it was imposed. Two studies have examined
the impact of the MICRA cap on verdicts. Using the California Jury Ver-
dicts Weekly, one set of authors gathered data on 152 malpractice cases
tried from 1985 to 2002, in which the jury's award of non-economic dam-
ages was both ascertainable and in excess of the cap.73 Across the entire
sample, the non-econ cap reduced the aggregated total verdict by 34 per-
cent, from $390 million to $253 million. Considering only the portion of
verdicts directed to non-economic damages, the aggregate reduction was 73
percent. Non-economic damage awards correlated positively with injury
severity as measured on the NAIC scale, except when the injury was death.
For this reason, the MICRA cap hit plaintiffs with severe injuries especially
hard: "The mean reductions for grave injury were seven times larger than
those for minor injury; the differences in medians for these two levels of
injury differed by a factor of three." 74 Plaintiffs with pain or disfigurement
experienced the largest reductions in their verdicts. As the authors noted,
"because verdicts for injuries such as deafness, numbness, disfigurement,
and chronic pain attracted relatively small economic damages awards, im-
position of the cap eliminated most of the award" in cases with these inju-
ries. 75 No evidence indicated that the MICRA cap affected female or
elderly plaintiffs more than others.
Another study examined 257 California jury verdicts decided from
1995-1999, also using California Jury Verdicts Weekly as its data source. 76
It found that the non-economic cap applied in 45 percent of cases and re-
duced the aggregate jury award 30 percent, from $421 million to $295 mil-
lion. The cap affected death cases more often than cases with non-fatal
injuries (58 percent versus 41 percent):
The median reduction in capped-death cases was $459,000, compared
with $286,000 for injury cases, and the median percentage reduction in
total awards when the cap was imposed was 49 percent, compared with
28 percent in injury cases. The reason for these deep percentage cuts in
total award size for death cases is that, on average, death cases receive
73. See Studdert et al., supra note 57, at 54-67.
74. Id. at 60.
75. Id. at 62.
76. NICHOLAS M. PACE ET AL., CAPPING NON-ECONOMIC AWARDS IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE




relatively low awards for economic damages compared with the awards
originally granted by juries for non-economic damages. 77
This study also found that the MICRA cap affected some types of plaintiffs
more than others. The MICRA cap reduced verdicts in 71 percent of cases
with verdicts in favor of infants, and the median reduction for this group
was $1.5 million, "far more than the median for individual plaintiffs with
injury claims ($268,000)."78 As a percentage of total awards, however,
infants fared better than others-22 percent versus 32 percent for all plain-
tiffs-because infants' economic awards were relatively large. Awards
were reduced for 67 percent of plaintiffs aged sixty-five years or older, but
the plaintiffs had the smallest median dollar reduction. Females suffered
larger median reductions than males-34 percent versus 25 percent.
Another study focused on a nationwide sample of 322 jury verdict
cases decided from 1984-2005 involving urologists that appeared in an on-
line database. 79 Jurors found for the defendant in slightly over half the cas-
es, a far higher plaintiff success rate than is found in malpractice trials
more generally. The authors adjusted the gross verdicts to reflect the degree
of negligence attributed to the urologist so as to take account of the influ-
ence of comparative negligence statutes on defendants' financial responsi-
bility. The states covered by the sample included some that enacted or
repealed caps during the period. The authors controlled for whether a cap
was in effect when a trial occurred. The findings were mixed:
[s]tates with caps had lower median verdict or settlement amounts com-
pared to states without caps ($350,000 vs $491,500), suggesting that lim-
its on noneconomic damages may have had an impact. However, in the
12 states that did and did not have caps during the study period the medi-
an verdict or settlement during the time without limits on damages was
only $150,000, suggesting that the implementation of caps did not de-
crease median awards.80
The authors do not indicate whether they adjusted verdicts or settlements
for inflation, and it appears that the numbers reported were based on jury
verdicts-not on actual payments. (This is a significant weakness: as
dscribed above and below, defendants and their insurers often pay plaintiffs
much less than juries award.) Determining whether particular cases are
subject to a damages cap is difficult, because the effective date of the stat-
77. Id. at xxi.
78. Id at xxiii.
79. Michael H. Hsieh et. al., Medical Malpractice in American Urology: 22-Year National Review
of the Impact of Caps and Implications for Contemporary Practice, 179 J. UROLOGY 1944, 1944
(2008).
80. Id. at 1945.
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ute is usually tied to filing date, and not the date a trial occurred. 81 Finally,
the unusually high plaintiff win rate suggests that defense victories were
under-reported, a problem that affects jury verdict reporters in general.
4. Accuracy of the Liability System
Health care providers and other critics of the tort system contend that
it allocates payments haphazardly-like a policeman handing out more
tickets to those who comply with the traffic laws than to those who run red
lights.82 However, the weight of the evidence suggests that the system dis-
tinguishes between valid and invalid claims reasonably well, but is far from
perfect.83 Indeed, "over the past several years, a consensus has emerged
among academic observers that the medical malpractice system operates,
overall, in a rational and predictable way. There is a clear connection be-
tween the quality of the case, expressed in terms of likely liability, and
compensation." 84 At least in the U.S., the largest problem appears to be the
frequency with which the tort system denies compensation to patients with
valid claims.
One recent study assessed accuracy by obtaining insurer's assessments
of care quality for malpractice claims filed in North Carolina courts after
the underlying cases had been resolved. "Money was paid in 78% of cases
that were evaluated as having probable liability, in 73.7% of cases in which
liability was assessed as uncertain, and in 33.3% of cases in which liability
was viewed as unlikely."85 Concordance between the evaluations of the
plaintiffs attorney and the defense attorney also correlated with the likeli-
hood of payment.
81. See RONEN AVRAHAM, DATABASE OF STATE TORT REFORMS (2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract-902711.
82. Troyen A. Brennan & Philip K. Howard, Heal the Law, Then Health Care, WASH. POST, Jan.
25, 2004, at B07; William R. Brody, President, The Johns Hopkins University, Is the Legal System
Killing Healthcare?, address at the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research Luncheon (Feb. 25, 2003),
available at web.jhu.edulold/president/speeches/2003/legalsys.html; William R. Brody, Dispelling
Malpractice Myths, WASH. PoST, Nov. 14, 2004, at B07; Florida Stop Lawsuit Abuse, Watchdog Says
Floridians are Fed Up with Lawsuit Abuse as South Florida Courts again Top List of "Judicial Hell-
holes" (Dec. 17, 2008), http://www.floridastoplawsuitabuse.com/newsroom_121608.html; PHYSICIAN
INSURERS ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, http://www.piaa.us/ (last visited March 13, 2009); Darien Cohen
et al., Malpractice Claims on Emergency Physicians: Time and Money, J. EMERGENCY MED. (Epub
ahead of print, 2008).
83. See BAKER, supra note 36; Hyman & Silver, supra note 48, at 1087; SLOAN & CHEPKE, supra
note 36.
84. Catherine T. Harris et al., Does Being a Repeat Player Make a Difference? The Impact of
Attorney Experience and Case-Picking on the Outcome of Medical Malpractice Lawsuits, 8 YALE J.
HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 253, 261 (2008).
85. Id. at 272.
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Two studies examined the quality of care and the resolutions of forty-
two closed malpractice claims against neurologists, all of which were cov-
ered by the same insurer.86 The first study focused on "whether the neurol-
ogist committed harmful, preventable errors"; the second focused on
whether errors occurred that were harmful and negligent. The neurologist-
authors reviewed all the information in the insurer's files to make these
determinations. The authors then compared their assessments of the neuro-
logical services to the outcome, framed as whether a payment on behalf of
the neurologist was made. Table 4 displays the results of both studies.
TABLE 4. ACCURACY OF OUTCOMES
Payment (N (%)) No Payment (N (%)) Totals
Harmful substandard care 6 (82%) 13 (68%) 19
Appropriate care 1 (4%) 22 (96%) 23
Totals 7 35 42
Note: p=0.034 (two-tailed Fisher's exact test).
Of the nineteen claims found to have harmful substandard care, only a
minority (32 percent) closed with payments; the plaintiffs in the remaining
cases received no compensation from the culpable neurologists. Accuracy
was significantly better for claims with appropriate care. Of these twenty-
three claims, 96 percent closed without payments on behalf of the treating
neurologists. As the authors summarized their findings, "a plaintiff was
eight times more likely to receive payment if the defendant had rendered
substandard care than if the defendant had not (32 percent vs. 4 percent)."87
In 2006, researchers affiliated with Harvard University School of Pub-
lic Health studied the malpractice system's accuracy using a random sam-
ple of 1,452 closed claim files from a geographically diverse group of five
insurance carriers.88 The files contained all materials available to the insur-
ers, including litigation-related materials like expert witnesses' opinions,
and were supplemented with medical records obtained from the insureds.
The researchers then assigned physicians trained in the relevant specialty to
review the files. The reviewers determined whether an injury occurred,
how severe it was, and whether a treatment error caused it. They also
gauged the strength of the evidence showing that an error occurred on a 6-
86. Lee D. Cranberg et al., Do the Claims Hold Up? A Study of Medical Negligence Claims
Against Neurologists, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 155, 155 (2007); Thomas H. Glick et al., Neuro-
logic Patient Safety: An In-Depth Study of Malpractice Claims, 65 NEUROLOGY 1284, 1284 (2005).
87. Cranberg et al., supra note 86, at 160.
88. Studdert et al., supra note 8, at 2025.
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level scale ranging from "virtually certain evidence" (6) to "little or no
evidence" (1).
According to the reviewers, nearly all the claims in the sample in-
volved treatment-related injuries. Ninety percent of the injuries were physi-
cal, and most were severe. In 26 percent of the cases, the patient died. The
correlation between errors and payments was strong. The "right" result
(error/payment or no error/no payment) occurred about 73 percent of the
time. Error claims predominated in the sample, accounting for 64 percent
of all claims and 84 percent of all indemnity payments. The strength of the
evidence of error mattered as well: "The probability of payment increased
monotonically with reviewers' confidence that an error had occurred."89
The system's biggest failings were: (1) its tendency to withhold pay-
ments from deserving claimants, (2) the time it took to resolve claims, and
(3) the loading costs it entailed. For example, "[o]ne in six claims involved
errors and received no payment"-with false negatives (error/no payment)
1.6 times more likely than false positives (no error/payment).
A follow-up study used multivariate regression to identify factors that
were associated with false negatives and false positives.90 For false nega-
tives (unpaid error claims), trials were the most important predictor. For
false positives (paid non-error claims), the best predictors were infant pa-
tients and institutional defendants (e.g., hospitals). Clarity of evidence also
mattered. Both types of error were less common when insurers and review-
ers were confident in their assessments of the quality of care.
5. Frivolous Lawsuits
Reform advocates have attacked the malpractice liability system on
the grounds that the way in which plaintiffs lawyers are compensated (i.e.,
with fees contingent on recovery) encourages them to bring frivolous law-
suits in the hopes of winning the "litigation lottery." These frivolous law-
suits reportedly drive up health care costs and discourage health care
providers. 91 As we have observed elsewhere, the argument that frivolous
lawsuits are common, or represent a viable business strategy for plaintiffs'
attorneys, is problematic. Malpractice carriers know how to evaluate
89. Id. at 2028.
90. David M. Studdert & Michelle M. Mello, When Tort Resolutions are "Wrong": Predictors of
Discordant Outcomes in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 547, 547 (2007).
91. Warren Vieth, Bush Hammers Medical Malpractice Suits, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2005, at A17;
Peter Baker, Bush Campaigns to Curb Lawsuits: President Says Junk' Litigation is Driving Small-
Town Doctors out of Business, WASH. POST, Jan. 6, 2005, at A06.
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claims, and they only pay claims they think have merit.92 Knowing this,
plaintiff s lawyers have little incentive to take weak cases-and they quick-
ly drop such cases once it becomes apparent they are weak.93 Nor can pa-
tients sue successfully without a lawyer's help. In Texas, for example, few-
fewer than 1 percent of paid malpractice claims involved pro se litigants
who filed complaints on their own.94
To be sure, most claims turn out to lack merit, if one judges solely by
whether compensation is paid. But, it follows neither that these claims were
frivolous nor that payment was properly denied. Since non-negligent treat-
ment is the rule, even a small error rate in screening will result in a substan-
tial number of cases that lack merit being initiated, and subsequently
dropped. Further, many cases involve judgment and "close calls." These
factors suggest we should be cautious in ascribing frivolity to the observed
patterns.
6. Cost of Medical Errors/Adverse Events
Estimates of the aggregate cost of medical errors and adverse events
are impressively high, although there is inevitably some "squishiness" in
the estimates. In its 1999 report, the Institute of Medicine estimated that
medical errors cost the U.S. between $17 and $29 billion per year.95 In
2008, the Agency for Health Care Research and Quality estimated that
surgical errors cost nearly $1.5 billion per year.96 In 2006, drug-related
errors were estimated to cost as much as $3.5 billion per year.97 A 2008
study by a health care consulting firm put the cost of all adverse events at
$19.5 billion,98 while a 2003 study by AHRQ pegged the cost of avoidable
92. Ralph Peeples et al., The Process of Managing Medical Malpractice Cases: The Role of
Standard of Care, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 877, 885 (2002); Catherine T. Harris et al., Who are Those
Guys? An Empirical Examination of Medical Malpractice Plaintiffs' Attorneys, 58 SMU L. Rev. 225,
245-47 (2005).
93. Henry S. Farber & Michelle J. White, Medical Malpractice: An Empirical Examination of the
Litigation Process, 22 RAND J. ECONOMICS 199, 200 (1991); Herbert M. Kritzer, Contingency Fee
Lawyers as Gatekeepers in the Civil Justice System, 81 JUDICATURE 22, 22 (1997); Huycke & Huycke,
supra note 19, at 797.
94. Silver & Hyman, supra note 18, at 377.
95. INST. OF MEDICINE, supra note 26.
96. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NEW AHRQ STUDY FINDS SURGICAL ERRORS
COST NEARLY $1.5 BILLION ANNUALLY (July 28, 2008) (press release), available at
http://www.ahrq.gov/news/press/pr2008/surgerrpr.htm.
97. NAT'L ACADEMIES, MEDICATION ERRORS INJURE 1.5 MILLION PEOPLE AND COST BILLIONS
OF DOLLARS ANNUALLY (July 20, 2006) (press release), available at
http://www8.nationalacademies.org/onpinews/newsitem.aspx?recordid= 11623.
98. JON SHREVE ET AL., THE ECONOMIC MEASUREMENT OF MEDICAL ERRORS 5 (2010).
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adverse events in the hospital at $4.6 billion per year.99 The aggregate so-
cial cost of these medical errors has been estimated to range up to $958
billion per year. 00
Who bears the cost of these medical errors and adverse events? One
study of inpatients in Colorado and Utah found that "[o]n average, hospi-
tals externalized 78 percent of the costs of all injuries and 70 percent of the
costs of negligent injuries."' 0' An earlier study found that hospitals inter-
nalized roughly two-thirds of the cost of negligent treatment, but that study
focused only on the costs of inpatient treatment, and excluded other costs,
such as lost earnings and non-economic damages.102
7. Cost of the Liability System
The direct costs of the malpractice liability system are widely estimat-
ed to be on the order of $20-$30 billion per year. What about the indirect
costs (principally defensive medicine)? Tort reform advocates claim that
defensive medicine costs $100-$300 billion per year, but empirical studies
put the cost much lower.
Kessler and McClellan performed the first rigorous studies of the im-
pact of tort reforms on health care spending.103 Using longitudinal data on
Medicare beneficiaries who received cardiac treatments in hospitals in
three years (1984, 1987, and 1990), they found that damages caps and other
reforms that limited liability directly reduced post-treatment medical
spending by 5-9 percent, without adverse health effects. Other tort reforms
did not produce statistically significant spending reductions. Kessler and
McClellan subsequently reanalyzed their data while controlling for man-
aged care penetration, and found smaller but still significant results.104
In their original article, Kessler and McClellan observed that "if our
results are generalizable to other medical expenditures outside the hospital,
to other illnesses, and to younger patients, then direct [tort] reforms could
99. Chunliu Zhan & Marlene R. Miller, Excess Length of Stay, Charges, and Mortality Attributa-
ble to Medical Injuries During Hospitalization, 290 JAMA 1868, 1872 (2003).
100. John C. Goodman et al., The Social Cost of Adverse Medical Events, and What We Can Do
About It, 30 Health Aff. 490 (Apr. 2011).
101. Michelle M. Mello et al., Who Pays for Medical Errors? An Analysis of Adverse Event Costs,
the Medical Liability System, and Incentives for Patient Safety Improvement, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL.
STUD. 835, 850 (2007).
102. Chunliu Zhan et al., Medicare Payment for Selected Adverse Events: Building the Business
Case for Investing in Patient Safety, 25 HEALTH AFF. 1386, 1390-1391 (2006).
103. Daniel P. Kessler & Mark B. McClellan, Do Doctors Practice Defensive Medicine?, Ill Q. J.
ECON. 353, 353 (1996).
104. See Daniel P. Kessler & Mark B. McClellan, How Liability Law Affects Medical Productivity,
21 J. HEALTH ECON. 931, 949 (2002).
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lead to expenditure reductions of well over $50 billion per year without
serious adverse consequences for health outcomes."105 Tort reform advo-
cates played up Kessler and McClellan's number and played down their
qualification. One stated flatly that nationwide tort reform would save
"well over $50 billion a year."l 06 In 2002, the Department of Health &
Human Services issued a report that relied on Kessler and McClellan, and
concluded that tort reform "would save $70-$126 billion in health care
costs per year."107
Recent studies have suggested the cost of defensive medicine is far
lower. In 2004, the Congressional Budget Office reported that when it ap-
plied Kessler and McClellan's methods to a broader range of medical con-
ditions, "it found no evidence that restrictions on tort liability reduce
medical spending." 08 A study by Sloan and Shadle that covered more con-
ditions and a longer span of years also produced insignificant results.109 A
recent study's findings are summed up by its title: there are "low costs"
associated with defensive medicine, and "small savings from tort re-
form."110 Other studies have found stronger evidence of defensive medi-
cine. One recent study found that health care spending was 3-4 percent
lower in states that had adopted tort reform,' and another review put the
cost of defensive medicine at $45.6 billion, while acknowledging the poor
quality of the evidence supporting this figure.112
Using Medicare data, we are currently analyzing the relationship be-
tween claim rates, tort reform, and health care spending in Texas. Our re-
sults indicate that malpractice risk does not significantly affect health care
spending."13
105. Kessler & McClellan, supra note 103, at 387-388.
106. Peter Huber, Rx: Radical Lawyerectomy, Forbes, Jan. 27, 1997, at 112, available at
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/1997/0127/59021l2a.html.
107. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ADDRESSING THE NEW HEALTH CARE CRISIS 11
(2003) available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/medliab.htm.
108. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, LIMITING TORT LIABILITY FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 6 (2004)
available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/49xx/doc4968/01-08-MedicalMalpractice.pdf.
109. Frank A. Sloan & John H. Shadle, Is There Empirical Evidence for "Defensive Medicine": A
Reassessment, 28 J. HEALTH ECON. 481, 486 (2009).
110. J. William Thomas, Erika C. Ziller & Deborah A. Thayer, Low Costs OfDefensive Medicine,
Small Savings From Tort Reform, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1578, 1578 (2010).
111. Fred J. Hellinger & William E. Encinosa, The Impact of State Laws Limiting Malpractice
Damage Awards on Health Care Expenditures, 96 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1375, 1375 (2006).
112. Michelle M. Mello, Amitabh Chandra, Atul A. Gawande & David M. Studdert, National Costs
Of The Medical Liability System, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1569, 1574 (2010).
113. MYUNGHO M. PAIK ET AL., HOW DO THE ELDERLY FARE IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
LITIGATION, BEFORE AND AFTER TORT REFORM? EVIDENCE FROM TEXAS, 1988-2009 (2011), availa-
ble at http://ssrn.comWe/abstract-1605331.
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III. ATTITUDES AND CONCERNS ABOUT THE LIABILITY AND
COMPENSATION SYSTEMS
In the United States, trial lawyers and the tort system are exceeding-
ly unpopular. There is certainly plenty of room for improvement in the tort
system, but the degree of unpopularity probably has something to do with
the existence of a determined, decades-long campaign framing the issues
around depictions of greedy and predatory trial lawyers, frivolous lawsuits,
and biased judges. The American Tort Reform Association serves as an
umbrella organization, and annually designates several locations as "judi-
cial hellholes."ll 4 The U.S. Chamber of Commerce has an Institute for
Legal Reform that funds a wide range of initiatives and lobbies heavily for
tort reform.115 The Manhattan Institute has a Center for Legal Policy that
issues periodic reports on such subjects as "Trial Lawyers, Inc."116 Multi-
ple states have similar entities that focus on the specific issues within their
state (e.g., the Illinois Lawsuit Abuse Watch).1 17 And there are a host of
smaller organizations (e.g., Citizens Against Lawsuit Abuse, Stop Lawsuit
Abuse, and People for a FAIR Legal System). These groups have used a
wide array of strategies to get their message out, including lobbying, adver-
tisements, starting their own newspapers, distributing plush toys at state
fairs, and multiple other modes of communication. 118
Polling data indicates these efforts have been quite successful. A poll
conducted in November 2010 by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, found
that 88 percent of those polled (1,000 voters who cast ballots in the 2010
mid-term election) "believe[d] there [were] too many 'meritless' lawsuits,
while eight out of ten want[ed] the next Congress to continue reforming the
legal system."ll 9 It is no accident that the Association of Trial Lawyers of
America (ATLA) changed its name in 2006 to the American Association
for Justice. A contemporaneous article stated "the switch was viewed as an
114. AM. TORT REFORM ASS'N, JUDICIAL HELLHOLES, http://www.judicialhellholes.org/about/ (last
visited Sept. 1, 2011).
115. INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/about-ilr.html (last visited
Sept. 1, 2011).
116. ,MANHATTAN INST. FOR POLICY RESEARCH, About the Center for Legal Policy,
http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/clp.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2011).
117. ILL. LAWSUIT ABUSE WATCH, http://www.illawsuitabusewatch.org/about.html (last visited
Sept. 1, 2011).
118. Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, A Quiet Revolution In Business Lobbying, WASH. POST, Feb. 5, 2005, at
A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A64725-2005Feb4.html; Jeffrey H.
Birnbaum, Advocacy Groups Blur Media Lines, WASH POST, Dec. 6, 2004, at A01, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A38184-2004Dec5.html.
119. INST. FOR LEGAL RESEARCH, NINE OUT OF TEN VOTERS SAY "MERITLESS" LAWSUITS ARE A




acknowledgment that trial lawyers are unpopular and losing the public
relations battle." 20
Plaintiffs' lawyers are exceedingly unpopular, and so is the tort sys-
tem-and there are plenty of reasons for dissatisfaction with the perfor-
mance of the tort system. Unfortunately, it does not follow that the reforms
that are enacted will actually address the known pathologies of the tort
system. For several decades, the field of play has been frozen in a debate
over the desirability of caps on non-economic damages-which are, at best,
a partial solution to a relatively minor problem. Even if damages caps were
a perfect solution to all the problems of the tort system (which even propo-
nents do not claim), it appears that most of the states that are likely to adopt
damages caps have already done so.
IV. WHY Do THINGS LOOK THE WAY THEY Do?
As we have written previously, one can explain many of the features
of the U.S. medical error/adverse event/malpractice landscape by focusing
on the applicable incentives that result from the institutional choices im-
bedded in the U.S. health care financing/delivery and litigation systems.121
For example, injured patients rarely sue because some medical errors are
hard to spot, and because most errors inflict harms that are small or tempo-
rary. By contrast, those who file lawsuits are seriously injured, and the
severity skew appears to be increasing over time (as tort reform makes
cases involving less severe injuries nonviable). Given the costs and delays
of litigation, patients with lesser injuries are usually better off letting the
matter drop ("lumping it"), complaining, changing providers, or seeking
assistance from regulators.122
Financial need is also an important motivating factor for patients. Be-
cause first-party health insurance generally covers treatment costs, the de-
sire to sue is often weak. As noted previously, first-party insurance also
makes litigation less profitable for claimants because first-party carriers are
entitled to recoup the amounts they have advanced through subrogation.123
120. Debra C. Weiss, Acronym Soup Suit, A.B.A. J. (Nov. 30, 2007),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/acronym soup suit aaj formerlyatlasuestheatla/.
121. Hyman & Silver, supra note 48.
122. Marlynn L. May & Daniel B. Stengel, Who Sues Their Doctors? How Patients Handle Medi-
cal Grievances, 24 LAW & SOC'Y. REV. 105, 117 (1990).
123. Deborah R. Hensler et al., COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTAL INJURIES IN THE UNITED STATES
17-18 (The Inst. For Civil Justice ed. 1991); William G. Johnson et al., The Economic Consequences of
Medical Injuries: Implications for a No-Fault Insurance Plan, 267 JAMA 2487, 2491 (1992); BAKER,
supra note 36.
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V. WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED BY STUDYING TEXAS?
Over the past decade, along with several co-authors, we have used an
enormous database of closed claims to assess the performance of the mal-
practice liability system in Texas. In this section, we will highlight a selec-
tion of our findings that that shed light on the issues discussed in this
article.
A. Who Decides Malpractice Cases?
Physicians hate and fear juries, and doubt their competence to decide
complex malpractice cases. This is true even though many studies find that
physicians win most malpractice trials124 and despite the fact that trials are
comparatively rare. Most malpractices cases are either dropped by plain-
tiffs or resolved with voluntary payments before trial. Settlements occurred
in 97.5 percent of the Texas malpractice claims that closed with payments
from 1988-2002. Settlements also accounted for 95 percent of the total
dollars paid.125
B. Does it Matter How Much the Jury Awards in a Malpractice
Case?
Providers and their insurers often contend that jury awards are rising
quickly and driving up costs. In Texas, we found no time trend in jury
awards after adjusting for general inflation. 126 We also learned that the
absolute amount a jury awards a plaintiff matters a lot less than one might
think because awards are routinely discounted in settlement negotiations. In
other words, defendants and their insurers usually pay much less than juries
award. Over the dataset as a whole, they paid less than half the amount that
was awarded (including pre-judgment interest).
As noted previously, awards are discounted for several reasons, in-
cluding appellate reversals and reductions required by statutory damages
caps. But the biggest factor was that voluntary settlements occur in the
shadow of providers' policy limits. If the policy limits are $500,000, it
doesn't matter whether the jury awards $1 million, $5 million, or $50 mil-
lion. The plaintiff is likely to recover at most $500,000. The rest of the
award will be written off. In practical effect, policy limits cap recoveries.
124. See, e.g., COHEN, supra note 10, at 2 (reporting that the plaintiffs won only 27 percent of
malpractice trials).
125. Black etal.,supra note 10, atX.
126. Id. at 251.
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Because large jury verdicts are more likely to exceed providers' insur-
ance limits, they are discounted the most substantially in settlement negoti-
ations. The size of the discount, which we refer to as a "haircut," increases
in both percentage terms and absolute dollars as the size of the award rises.
The plaintiffs who won the largest jury awards (and who presumably had
the most severe injuries and the greatest needs) sacrificed the most when
settling their claims. In the small fraction of cases with payments exceeding
the primary policy limits, the payments usually come from insurers, not
providers. Providers have little to fear in the way of personal liability from
jury awards, at least in Texas medical malpractice cases.
C. How Much Coverage Do Physicians Have?
Because injured patients recover almost exclusively from providers'
insurance, it is important to know how much insurance providers maintain
and whether the size of their policies has changed over time. Texas does
not regulate the amount of coverage doctors must obtain. Consequently,
doctors may carry as much or as little insurance as they want.
The conventional wisdom is that providers carry policies with occur-
rence and aggregate annual limits of $1 million and $3 million, respective-
ly, but this is not true in Texas. Considering only providers with paid
claims-the most important group from the perspective of injured patients
and physicians-the median policy limit across all years was $500,000
(nominal). Only 37 percent of providers with paid claims had insurance
policies with per occurrence limits of $1 million or more (nominal). Thirty-
two percent carried $200,000 or less (nominal) in coverage. Physicians
whose paid claims concerned the treatment of newborn infants carried less
insurance than others, but had a higher risk of making an out-of-pocket
payment.
The real amount of insurance available to cover patients' losses also
declined dramatically over time. From 1988-1999, the policy years in the
dataset for which the collection of claims was likely to be complete, the
real mean and median limits for physicians fell by about 30 percent. The
decline would be even larger if discounted to reflect the real increase in
medical costs. Texas appears to be rapidly reaching a point at which under-
compensation of claimants will be unavoidable because doctors carry insuf-
ficient insurance.
196 [Vol 87:1
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE
D. Do Changes in the Tort System (i.e., increases in the number of
claims, or payouts per claim) Help Explain the Malpractice Crises
that Hit the United States in 2000-2003?
Every decade or so, the price of malpractice insurance spikes. When
this happens, providers and their insurers routinely blame the legal system,
contending that claim rates and jury awards are shooting skyward. Because
our Texas data starts in 1988, we cannot say anything useful about the mal-
practice crises that occurred in the 1970s and 1980s. We can say, however,
that the insurance crisis that hit Texas in 2000-2003 was driven by forces
operating outside the liability system. During the years immediately pre-
ceding this crisis and throughout the crisis years themselves, the number of
claims (controlling for population) and the dollars paid per claim (control-
ling for inflation) held steady or declined. Defense costs rose at a healthy
clip, but they did not constitute a sufficiently large share of total payouts to
drive a malpractice crisis. They also rose steadily, rather than suddenly,
making them poor candidates to explain insurance price spikes. Thus, in-
surance-side dynamics provide the most likely explanation for the premium
spikes that occurred in 2000-2003.
E. Impact of Tort Reforms on Claim Frequency and Payouts
If the object of tort reform is to reduce the amount of money that
flows through the liability system, the package of lawsuit restrictions Texas
adopted in 2003 was a spectacular success. After being fairly stable for the
preceding decade, the number of paid claims per 100,000 Texas residents
fell by 57 percent from 2004-2008. The decline was not evenly spread
across age categories, however. The frequency of claims involving babies
and children declined by 41 percent, while the number of claims involving
non-elderly and elderly adults fell by roughly 65 percent. Over the same
period, claim severity, defined as the payout per capita for all claims with
payouts exceeding $25,000 (in 1988 dollars), dropped by 29 percent for
non-elderly claimants and 33 percent for elderly claimants.127 Combined,
these findings imply a 75 percent drop in total payouts.
Anecdotal evidence also reflects the strong impact of the 2003 tort re-
form legislation. In 2009, claims intake at the Texas Medical Liability
Trust (TMLT), the state's largest malpractice carrier, was "approximately
half of the amount [TMLT] experienced in the years prior to tort reform,"
127. PAIK ET AL., supra note 113, at 13.
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even though the number of insured physicians increased.128 In 2009,
TMLT's "[t]otal trial losses ... amounted to less than $1 million, one of
the lowest trial loss years ever recorded."l 29 All told, TMLT attributes a 50
percent decline in the cost of medical liability insurance to the 2003 re-
forms. 130 Other medical malpractice carriers have also reduced prices sub-
stantially.
CONCLUSION
Readers should now understand that the manner in which the United
States seeks to protect patients from avoidable harms is dysfunctional. Alt-
hough the rhetoric of patient safety is heard everywhere, the fragmentation
of the health care delivery system reduces accountability, and the predomi-
nant "encounter-based, quality-insensitive, fee-for-service" payment sys-
tem fails to incentivize providers to deliver error-free care. To the contrary,
customary payment arrangements, which compensate providers for the
additional services injured patients require, make medical errors profitable
and discourage providers from making desirable improvements.
The system for compensating injured patients is also nothing to brag
about. Because it is expensive and slow, it is only a viable option for pa-
tients with severe injuries and large damages. These are also the only pa-
tients that can find plaintiffs' attorneys-since their cases are the only ones
with damages large enough to justify acceptance by a plaintiffs attorney
who is working on contingency. Small claims have too little profit potential
to support a credible threat of going to trial, and without that threat, a plain-
tiffs' attorney cannot force an insurer to pay. The result is dramatic under-
claiming-which makes it difficult for the liability system to play a sub-
stantial role in quality improvement.
In the words that concluded the Harry and Louise commercial that
helped sink the Clinton health reform bill in 1994, "there's got to be a bet-
ter way." To date, the United States has not yet found it.
128. TExAS MEDICAL LIABILITY TRUST, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT 6 (2009). This is in nominal
dollars; the decline would be larger if adjusted for inflation.
129. Id. at 4.
130. Id.
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